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Abstract Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural
science, 1991a, 1991b; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004; Thought
experiments, 2008) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be argu-
ments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples
of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown
calls such TEs “platonic”). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent them
as arguments for logical reasons: there is no logic that can adequately model such
phenomena. (Brown further argues that this being the case, “platonic” TEs provide
us with irreducible insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature). I argue against
this approach by describing how “platonic” TEs can be modeled within the logical
framework of adaptive proofs for prioritized consequence operations. To show how
this mundane apparatus works, I use it to reconstruct one of the key examples used by
Brown, Galileo’s TE involving falling bodies.
Keywords Thought experiments · Platonism · Prioritized consequence ·
Entrenchment · Non-defeated consequence · Adaptive logics ·
Platonic thought experiments · Galileo · Aristotle
1 Philosophical motivations
Empiricism about thought experiments (TEs), especially as they occur in the history of
science, is the view that TEs are nothing but “ordinary argumentation that is disguised
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in a vivid pictorial or narrative form” (Norton 2004b, p. 45). This view, represented
for instance by Norton (1996, 2004a,b), is rejected by Brown (1991a,b, 2004, 2008),
who embraces the opposite view dubbed Platonism about TEs and insists that TEs
provide us with insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature, resulting in what he
calls “a priori (though still fallible) knowledge of nature” (Brown 2008).
Brown’s argumentative strategy can be summarized as follows:
– He argues that there are TEs which cannot be reconstructed as arguments and
nevertheless provide us with new information.
– It is rather uncontroversial that such TEs are not empirical observations.
– He suggests that the only way they can provide new information while being neither
arguments nor empirical observations is if they are acts of perceiving the abstract
realm of laws of nature (and because he postulates the existence of such a realm,
his view is called ‘platonism’).
While the last move is debatable, I will not discuss it in this paper. Instead, I will
focus on the first step and argue that the argument can be blocked already at that step.
Brown rests his case for his first claim on the existence of what he calls “platonic”
TEs. Those are TEs which not only perform a destructive task by motivating the rejec-
tion of one of the initially accepted beliefs, but also lead to the correct resolution of
the encountered anomaly. Brown claims that if such arguments could be constructed
as arguments, there would be a logic which would capture the inferences involved. By
contraposition, he suggests that since there is no logic which can handle the dynamics
of platonic TEs, they cannot be interpreted as arguments.
While the move from the claim that TEs cannot be represented by arguments to
platonism about the laws of physics might seem hasty, Brown has a point in saying
that so far no formalized reconstruction of platonic TEs does justice to their dynam-
ics. How exactly can we start a TE, reach a contradiction and yet, within one and the
same TE, end up with a more or less acceptable conclusion, all the time using a single
sensible logical framework?
The goal of this paper is to describe a formal logical framework within which the
thought-experimental moves that Brown finds essential for his argument can be mod-
eled. Thus, the intention is to undermine his approach to TEs by answering the logical
challenge he posed.
2 Galileo on falling bodies
A classical example of what Brown calls “platonic” TEs is Galileo’s celebrated TE
concerned with the speed of falling bodies of different weights. Suppose you’re work-
ing within the Aristotelian framework. Then, the difference in speed between two
freely falling bodies is proportional to the difference in their weight. Imagine a heavy
cannon ball l and a really tiny musket ball made of the same material s falling from a
certain fixed height.
According to the Aristotelian assumption, l will be falling faster than s. Imagine
you join l and s together: since s is slower than l, it will slow l down, so the speed of
l +s (let’s denote the operation of joining bodies by the addition symbol) will be lower
than the speed of l. On the other hand, l + s is heavier than l itself, and that being the
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case, l + s has to fall faster than l on its own. So, we have a contradiction (given the
assumption that one thing cannot fall simultaneously slower and faster than another).
This is the destructive part of the TE. Further considerations [variously reconstructed
by different interpreters like Schrenk (2004), Brown (1991a), or Gendler (1998)] lead
to the conclusion that in fact, those bodies have to be falling at the same rate.
Brown (1991a, pp. 77–78) argues:
There have been no new empirical data […] the transition from the old to the new
theory […] is not readily explained in terms of empirical input unless there is
new empirical input. Galileo’s new theory is not logically deduced from old data.
Nor is it any kind of logical truth. A second way of making new discoveries […]
is by deducing them from old data. Norton holds such a view when he claims
that a thought experiment is really an argument. […Will this view] account for
those [thought experiments] I call platonic? I think not. The premisses of such an
argument could include all the data that went into Aristotle’s theory. [emphasis
mine, RU] From this Galileo derived a contradiction (So far, so good; we have a
straightforward argument which satisfies Norton’s account.) But can we derive
Galileo’s theory that all bodies fall at the same rate from these same premises?
Well, in one sense, yes, since we can derive anything from a contradiction; but
this hardly seems fair. What’s more, whatever we can derive from these premiss-
es is immediately questionable since, on the basis of the contradiction, we now
consider our belief in the premisses rightly to be undermined.
3 Straightforward reconstructions of Galileo’s TE
Norton doesn’t explicitly address Brown’s logical concern (how can the dynamic
aspect of platonic TEs be modeled by logical means?). In general, he doesn’t seem
to pay too much attention to logical details. He thinks that familiar logics (he doesn’t
really specify which those are) will suffice. To support this view, he gives what he
calls an “evolutionary argument”:
I think there are some reasons to believe that no new, exotic logic is called for. In
outlining the general notion of logic above, I recalled the evolutionary character
of the logic literature in recent times. New inferential practices create new niches
and new logics evolve to fill them. Now the activity of thought experimenting in
science was identified and discussed prominently a century ago by Mach (1897)
and TS have been used in science actively for many centuries more. So logicians
and philosophers interested in science have had ample opportunity to identify
any new logic that may be introduced by thought experimentation in science.
So my presumption is that any such logic has already been identified, in so far
as it would be of use in the generation and justification of scientific results. I do
not expect TS to require logics not already in the standard repertoire. This is,
of course, not a decisive argument. Perhaps the logicians have just been lazy or
blind. It does suggest, however, that it will prove difficult to extract a new logic
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from TS of relevance to their scientific outcomes—else it would already have
been done! (Norton 2004b, pp. 54–55)
To gain some perspective on this argument, consider the following “evolutionary”
argument. Norton, among other things, works on philosophy of relativity. Now, rela-
tivity theory has been around, pretty much, since the time when Mach wrote about TEs.
So philosophers interested in science have had ample opportunity to identify and solve
any philosophical issue that may be introduced by relativity theory. So, in this field,
any philosophically interesting claim has already been made and any philosophically
interesting argument has been given, and Norton’s work in philosophy or relativity is
redundant. Unless, of course, philosophers of science since the discovery of relativity
theory have just been lazy or blind.
In fact, Norton’s reconstruction of Galileo’s TE (Norton 1996, pp. 341–343) is logi-
cally quite straightforward. To obtain the destructive part of the argument, he identifies
all the assumptions needed to derive a contradiction from the Aristotelian assumption,
takes them as assumptions of the argument, uses the Aristotelian assumption for reduc-
tio, and derives a contradiction. Then, he adds one more assumption (that the speed of
falling bodies depends only on their weights) and argues that the claim that the objects
fall with the same speed follows.1 Next, he explains that this additional assumption
actually was not acceptable in the original context of the thought experiment, and
concludes that “this final step now looks more like a clumsy fudge or a stumble than
a leap into the Platonic world of laws.” (Norton 1996, p. 345)
Another construal of the Galilean argument has been given by Graham Priest.2 The
argument starts with the assumption that either l will be falling down faster than s, or
s will be falling down faster than l, or they will be falling with the same speed. Then,
two reductio arguments are employed to exclude the first two options, thus leaving us
with the only remaining solution.
4 Weak points of straightforward reconstructions
Whether we are to take the straightforward reconstructions of the sort mentioned above
to be successful clearly depends on what we want them to accomplish.
1 Initially, it might be unclear why this is supposed to constitute an addition: the Aristotelian assumption
entails it. To see why, let’s take a look at a very simplified representation. Say ‘W (x)’ and ‘S(x)’ stand for
the weight and speed of x respectively. Then, the assumption that the speed depends only on weight is
[DepOn] ¬∃x,y [W (x) = W (y) ∧ S(x) = S(y)]
and the Aristotelian assumption reads
[Ar] ∀x, y [W (x) > W (y) ≡ S(x) > S(y)]
Suppose [DepOn] fails while [Ar] holds. So for some a, b : W (a) = W (b) but S(a) = S(b). Then, either
S(a) > S(b) or S(b) > S(a). In the first case, by [Ar], W (a) > W (b). In the second case, by [Ar],
W (b) > W (a). Either way we contradict the assumption that W (a) = W (b). But one has to remember
that the assumption is added to the set of initial premises minus the Aristotelian assumption. And indeed,
[DepOn] is weaker than [Ar].
2 In a verbal discussion following my talk at the Logic, Reasoning Rationality 2010 conference organized
by Ghent University in Belgium.
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Sure, important chunks of processes in those TEs behave like those straightfor-
ward arguments. But given our current motivations, we need to measure their success
against the challenge posed by Brown. For him, the Galilean TE starts with the initial
acceptance of the Aristotelian assumption (see quote on Sect. 3), proceeds through an
actual contradiction and reaches the resolution.
The Aristotelian assumption is neither accepted unconditionally (if it were, it could
not be overthrown by further considerations), nor is it assumed without genuine accep-
tance, merely for reductio (for Galileo’s Aristotelian opponent really accepts it). It
rather seems that the assumption is accepted defeasibly, so that its acceptance is open
to revision (and in fact, being revised during the process).
These aspects are not modeled by Norton’s set-up in which the Aristotelian claim
is merely assumed for reductio, the obtained contradiction does not collide with the
agent’s initial beliefs and further steps towards the final conclusion are just taken to
be clumsy.3
Norton’s description, instead of a single formally reconstructed argument, involves
the interplay of a few arguments best described in meta-language rather than mod-
eled in a formal system (see below). Moreover, Norton merely uses the Aristotelian
assumption for reductio without representing its initial defeasible acceptance by the
Aristotelian. By giving an account which does not employ a single formally recon-
structed argument and does not model defeasible acceptance, Norton already makes
an unnecessary concession to Brown.
Another option is to stay classical, but instead of formally reconstructing the TE, to
tell a story in meta-language from an external perspective. This would involve saying
that at different times people involved used slightly different assumptions which they
revised for good reasons. While this approach makes it look more like a single argu-
ment, it does not really explain the logical mechanism underlying the revisions. In this
sense, this strategy fails to answer Brown’s challenge, who asked about the underlying
logic. To satisfy this requirement, I take it, a formalized reconstruction satisfying all
of the above described desiderata has to be provided.
If we want to be able to formally reconstruct a TE as a single argument, something
else than classical logic is needed. Of course, one is free to insist that apart from
the classical reconstructions there is no interesting story to be told and to deny the
need to model other aspects of the rational processes in question formally. This how-
ever means that one is not playing the same game as Brown anymore. He demands
a unifying formal account which captures also some aspects which straightforward
reconstructions fail to capture. While claiming that this challenge doesn’t have to be
met is one way to respond, it is unlikely to push the debate forward. The question
whether there are sensible logical systems which capture what Brown requires them
to capture still remains.
3 Observe that in Norton’s reconstruction some heavy-lifting is done by the choice of what is taken as a
mere assumption and what is taken as a reductio assumption of the proof. Schrenk (2004) reconstructs the
destructive argument in more detail than Norton, and suggests that logically speaking, it does not unambig-
uously lead to the rejection of the Aristotelian assumption (the rejection of any of the premises employed
in the argument would suffice, if one were guided only by the desire to avoid contradiction).
123
736 Synthese (2012) 187:731–752
Brown’s qualms aside, reconstructing TEs in physics as arguments has some inde-
pendent virtues. TEs can err [for a few nice examples, see Norton (2004b)] and the
error can stem from what we tacitly accept in the TE. Formalization allows us to see
all the assumptions involved, and this makes it easier to assess them.
5 What to do?
Gendler (1998) emphasizes that logically speaking, there are at least four non-trivial
ways out for the Aristotelian, when faced with the destructive part of Galileo’s TE,
and that for the right outcome a certain prior preference on the premises involved is
needed.4 Gendler’s reconstruction involves such a preference and belief revision. It is
quite natural, but it’s described informally and the request for a logic which underlies
the reasoning involved still has to be answered.
Thus, it would be useful to have a formal logic with proof theory which adequately
represents reasoning of the “platonic” sort. What desiderata should it satisfy? The sys-
tem should be able to keep track of preferences between premises involved, because
the lack of prioritization seems to be the key shortcoming of the logic employed
in straightforward reconstructions. It also should be able to model the rejection of
the least entrenched assumptions upon encountering a contradiction, without running
into logical triviality. Finally, after encountering a contradiction and rejecting one of
the premises, without the logical explosion, the system should allow one to use the
remaining premises in a sensible manner to derive the resolution.
I will argue that prioritized adaptive logics with their proof theory satisfy these
requirements. First, I will explain what adaptive logics and prioritized adaptive logics
are. Then, I will use a prioritized adaptive logic to reconstruct the destructive part of
Galileo’s TE. Next, I will show that there is an assumption that allows one to derive,
without any “clumsy fudges and stumbling,” that the two objects involved in the TE
will be falling at the same rate.5 Both the destructive and the constructive processes
will be modeled within one and the same argument, governed by one formal logical
system.
On the approach proposed in this paper, the adaptive formal framework will be
argued to be a convenient tool for capturing how TEs (to borrow a phrase from Kuhn)
“assist in the elimination of prior confusion by forcing the scientist to recognize
contradictions that had been inherent in his way of thinking from the start” even
though “the elimination of existing confusion does not seem to demand additional
empirical data” (Kuhn 1977, p. 242). The philosophical upshot will be that Brown’s
argument that some sort of platonic insight must be involved because logic can’t handle
further arguments once a contradiction is derived, fails.
4 She also has a fascinating epistemological story to tell about how the preference is discovered (Gendler
2004, 2007), but those issues are too far from my current concern.
5 It is enough to assume that if the two objects involved are made of the same material and are approximately
of the same shape then the lighter one will not fall faster than the heavier one (this assumption is weaker
than any of the assumptions suggested by Norton or Gendler).
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6 A simple adaptive logic
Adaptive logics with their dynamic proofs are quite complicated animals. Before
I move to dynamic proofs for prioritized consequence relations, let us take a look at
an adaptive system devised to handle some simple arguments about expectancies.
Adaptive logics are so called because they adapt themselves to the premises they
are applied to: the applicability of some rules or steps depends on the premises and on
what conclusions have been derived at a given stage of a proof.6 Roughly speaking,
while reasoning adaptively we use rules of two simpler logics (called the ‘lower limit
logic,’ LLL and the ‘upper limit logic,’ ULL, ULL being a strengthening of LLL).
The specific rules of the stronger logic are applied in proofs conditionally upon the
normal behavior of certain formulas (that is, upon the falsehood of formulas whose
truth is to be avoided if possible—they’re often called abnormalities), and if further
in the proof it turns out that those formulas do not behave normally, steps depending
on their normal behavior are retracted. Given a ULL and LLL, different choices of
sets of abnormalities lead to different adaptive logics.
This is all very general and hand-wavy, but examples which I will soon give should
make it clear how various adaptive logics fit this general profile. A mathematically pre-
cise and general definition of the so-called standard format of adaptive logics is avail-
able (Batens 2007).7 However, since it involves various technicalities not needed for
current considerations, I will avoid this level of detail and rather use examples to allow
the reader to understand enough of the formal systems to grasp their applicability to
the philosophical issue at hand. The standard format also provides adaptive logics with
a unified model theory: once an adaptive logic falls under the standard format, it has an
array of meta-theoretic properties (like soundness and completeness). Since, however,
I am not interested in model theory in this paper, such issues will be ignored. What will
matter is the description of the consequence operation, the corresponding proof theory
and the applicability of the logic to the philosophical problems we are interested in.
The fact that in an adaptive proof some steps can become retracted once new infor-
mation is derived allows for the representation of arguments which may be doubly
(externally and internally) dynamic. Externally dynamic, because most of adaptive
logics are nonmonotonic: once our premise set is extended by new input, we might
have to retract some of our previous conclusions if the new information makes some
steps unreliable. Adaptive logics are also internally dynamic because even with the
same premise set, it may turn out that a conclusion which is ULL-derived is no longer
reliable once at some later stage of the proof a problematic formula becomes LLL-
derived. Now, we’ll take a look at a simple example of an adaptive logic (I will restrict
myself to the propositional case).
6 Some basic papers about adaptive logics are Batens (1995, 2004, 2007). For more references, see the
website of the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science at Ghent University, http://logica.ugent.be/
centrum/writings/.
7 There are adaptive logics that do not fit the standard format, but the working (and confirmed by numerous
cases) hypothesis of Ghent research group is that all adaptive logics are equivalent to adaptive logics in the
standard format.
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In this simple adaptive logic LLL is the modal logic T for the standard modal propo-
sitional language built from a countable supply of propositional variables (p, q, r, p1,
q2, r2, . . .), negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), implication (→) and
modal operators ( and ♦). T is axiomatized by classical propositional logic (CL)
strengthened with all substitutions of axioms K and T
K (φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ)
T φ → φ
and the necessitation rule which from the fact that φ is a theorem (	 φ) allows to infer
that its necessitation is a theorem (	 φ).
In what follows we will need the fact that all substitutions of the following are
theorems of T.8
T1 ♦φ → (φ ∨ (♦φ ∧ ¬φ))
T2 ♦(φ ∧ ψ) → ♦φ
A slightly unusual feature of our interpretation of the modal language is that we read
♦φ (where φ is a non-modal formula) as ‘it is expected that φ’. This reading indicates
where the dynamic aspect comes in: we want to accept expectancies insofar as they
do not contradict the data, and to rectract conclusions which relied on expectancies
which later on turned out to contradict the data. This means, we want to defeasibly
assume that as many expectancies are true as we consistently can assume to be true:
we want to reject as many formulas of the form ♦φ ∧ ¬φ (where φ is non-modal) as
we can. I will call such formulas abnormalities and abbreviate them sometimes as !φ.
Once we define abnormalities this way, the upper limit logic is just T strengthened
with the assumption that all abnormalities are false.
A dynamic proof is a sequence of lines which consist of four components: a line
number, a formula (which we will call the formula of that line), a justification for that
formula, and a possibly empty set of formulas.9 Besides, each line can be marked
(marks can come and go as the proof progresses). If a line is at some point marked, it
means that the formula of this line is not considered derived at that stage. The first three
components are rather clear. Conditions and marking require some more attention.
There are three rules for proofs from a premise set . The first rule, Prem allows
one to introduce any premise φ ∈  with the empty set in the conditions column. That
is if φ ∈ , it allows to infer:
(n) φ Prem ∅
where n is an appropriate line number.
The second rule, Ru says that if we have proven φ1 on 1 (that is, we have 1
among the conditions of a line where φ1 is the formula), φ2 on 2, …, and φn on n ,
8 T1 is a theorem of propositional logic. T1 is a trivial theorem of logic K and all its extensions.
9 Often, these are abnormalities upon the assumption of whose falsehood the formula is derived. Not neces-
sarily so in the so-called direct proof theories. The column containing such sets will be called a dependence
column or a conditions column.
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and if ψ can be LLL-derived (in the present case, T-derived) from φ1, . . . , φn , we
can introduce ψ as relying on the normal behavior of 1 ∪ 2 ∪ · · · ∪ n . That is, if








(l) φ Ru: i, j, …, k 1 ∪ 2 · · · ∪ n
where i < j < k < l are appropriate line numbers. That is, we can add T-conse-
quences relying on nothing more and nothing less than the union of those sets on
which the premises depended.
The third rule, Rc, is based on the following idea. If from  we can T-derive that
either ψ is true or one of the formulas in a set of abnormalities  is true, we can con-
clude that ψ follows in our adaptive logic from  on the defeasible assumption that
formulas in  are false. If  is a finite set of abnormalities, let us call the disjunction
of its members ‘Dab()’. If for some finite set of abnormalities :








(l) ψ Rc: i, j, …, k 1 ∪ 2 · · · ∪ n ∪ 
That is, if either ψ is true or one of the abnormalities in  is true, then ψ holds, as
long as formulas in  behave normally (=are false). If ψ ∨ Dab() is derived from
φ1, . . . , φn by means of Prem and Ru only, then Rc allows to move Dab() into the
conditions column and add it to the union of dependencies of φ1, . . . , φn .
In particular, thanks to T1, if φ is non-modal, from ♦φ we can T-derive φ∨!φ, and
then Rc allows us to derive φ from ♦φ on the condition !φ. Another way to think
about this is to consider the (defeasible) assumption that a certain abnormality is false:
¬!φ. This means ¬(♦φ ∧¬φ) and is equivalent to ♦φ → φ. Thus, our adaptive logic
allows us (defeasibly) to drop single diamonds in front of non-modal formulas.
Our task in a proof is not only to derive formulas from premises but also to recog-
nize those steps which cannot be trusted. What do we mean by this? At the first (and
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not completely correct) stab, a step is unreliable if it depends on the falsehood of an
abnormality which as it turns out T-follows from the premises.
This is quite close. There is a complication, though. A premise set may T-prove
Dab() without proving any element of  separately. In such a case we learn that at
least one of the formulas involved in the dependence column doesn’t behave normally,
but we have no idea which disjunct is responsible. To deal with this issue, we need
something more.
A proof, as we conduct it, proceeds in stages. Every application of a rule carries us
to the next stage. A formula Dab() is a minimal Dab-formula of a proof at a stage
s iff Dab() occurs in the proof at a line with the condition ∅ (that is, if it’s derived
from the premises by means of T only) and for no ′ ⊂  (that is, for no ′ which
is a proper subset of ) the proof at stage s contains a line with Dab(′) derived on
condition ∅.
We need to define which lines of an adaptive proof are marked at which stages (intu-
itively, a marking symbol next to a line means the formula in that line is not derived at
a given stage of the proof). One of the simplest plausible marking definitions in this
context10 is the one based on reliability. On this definition, at a given stage a line is
marked (as unreliable) if it depends on a set of abnormalities , and at that stage some
member of  is a disjunct in a minimal disjunction of abnormalities T-derived from
the premises.
The intuitive reason why we are interested in minimal Dab-formulas of a proof
instead of just any proven Dab-formulas whatsoever is this. We want Dab-formulas
to help us discover those abnormalities whose normal behavior is not to be expected.
The fact that Dab() has been T-proven from the premises tells us only that at least
one member of  has to be true if the premises are to be true. However, we want to
assume that as many abnormalities are false as possible and we take any abnormality
to be false unless compelled to do otherwise. So, if we know that both Dab() and
Dab(′) are T-derived from our premises, but also that ′ ⊂ , we know that we do
not have to blame any member of  \ ′. If we want to accept as few abnormalities
as possible, it will suffice to assume that it is the members of ′ that are not reliable.
Hence, we first define Us() to be the union of all s that are constituents of those
minimal Dab-formulas that have been derived so far from  at stage s. Then, a line
in a proof is marked at stage s if it depends on the normal behavior of , and yet
at least one member of  is a member of Us(). That is, if a certain line contains a
certain set in the dependence column, and yet at least one member of this set is among
those abnormalities on whose normal behavior we can’t rely, the formula of that line
is not considered derived. As the proof proceeds, the list of minimal Dab-formulas
and Us() might change. If they do, certain line marks might come or go.
Since sometimes an unmarked line becomes marked later in the proof, the fact that
a line is derived and unmarked at a certain stage does not mean that it really follows
from the premises. (Similarly, the fact that a line is marked at a certain stage, doesn’t
mean that it won’t become unmarked at some later stage and that it doesn’t follow
from the premises.) Hence we also need the notion of final derivability. A formula is
10 A variety of marking definitions, depending on the goal of a logic is available (Batens 2007). You will
also see another marking definition in Sect. 8.
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finally derived in a proof if it is derived in an unmarked line of that proof at a finite
stage and also any extension of the proof in which it becomes marked can always be
itself extended into a proof where it is unmarked.
Suppose our premise set is  = {♦(p ∧ q),¬p ∨¬q,¬q}. Consider the following
adaptive proof (I present it in a slightly condensed form, superscripting marks with
line numbers to indicate when those marks appear and disappear).
(1) ♦(p ∧ q) Prem ∅
(2) ♦p Ru: 1, T2 ∅
(3) ♦q Ru: 1, T2 ∅
(4) p ∨ (♦p ∧ ¬p) Ru: 2, T1 ∅
(5) q ∨ (♦q ∧ ¬q) Ru: 3, T1 ∅
(6) p Rc: 4 {!p} 9,10
(7) q Rc: 5 {!q} 9,10,11
(8) ¬p ∨ ¬q Prem ∅
(9) (♦p ∧ ¬p) ∨ (♦q ∧ ¬q) Ru: 2, 3, 8 ∅
(10) ¬q Prem ∅
(11) ♦q ∧ ¬q Ru: 3, 10 ∅
In line (1) we just introduce a premise. In lines (2) and (3) we apply T2 twice to
distribute ♦ over a conjunction. Lines (4) and (5) follow by T1, and they are interesting
because their second disjuncts are abnormalities. Given the fact that lines (4) and (5)
T-follow from the premises, we are allowed to conditionalize on the normal behavior
of involved abnormalities, thus introducing p conditionally on the falsity of ♦p ∧¬p
and q conditionally on the falsity of ♦q ∧ ¬q in lines (6) and (7). In line (8) we
introduce another premise, which (together with lines (2) and (3)) CL-entails line (9).
At this point, our U9() = {!p, !q} (its elements occur in a—so far—minimal derived
disjunction of abnormalities). This means the lines marked right after the introduction
of line (9) are (6) and (7), because each of them depends on an abnormality which
is in U9. In line (10) we introduce the last premise11 which classically entails line
(11). But once line (11) is derived, the formula from line (9) no longer is a minimal
Dab-formula, and indeed U11 for our proof simply is {!q}. This means line (6) is at
this stage no longer suspect and is unmarked, while line (7) still relies on a formula in
U11 and remains marked. It is also clear that (6) contains a finally derived formula.
This should give the reader a sufficient grasp of what dynamic proofs look like.
Now, we can introduce another important element of our formal reconstruction of
Galileo’s TE: the prioritized consequence operation ND and its adaptive proof theory.
7 Non-defeated prioritized consequence operation
Say we are dealing with prioritized belief bases. Such a base  is identified with a finite
tuple of consistent belief levels i , which contain well-formed sentences of a given
language: 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉. The basic intuition here is that the lower the subscript is,
11 It is not required that all premises are introduced in the beginning of the proof. On the other hand, the
reader certainly can see that I introduce premises in a somewhat artificial order, but I do it to be able to
indicate a few different phenomena in a single simple proof.
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the more important the assumptions that belong to this set are. Note the assumption
that each level is consistent. This doesn’t mean that one’s beliefs in general have to be
consistent. The assumption here is weaker: it consists in the restriction that if a belief
set is inconsistent, it is not a set of beliefs of the same level of entrenchment. To some
extent, this is an idealization, for it excludes cases where we have equal support for
opposing conclusions. On the other hand, if this does happen, we rationally should
do our best to reassess the reasons we have and to either undermine one of them or
to strengthen the other. Since dealing with these issues would lead us far beyond our
considerations, this remark should suffice for now.12
As it turns out, there are many different ways we can delineate systematic inferen-
tial practices that one might use to deal with prioritized beliefs when some of them
lead to a contradiction.13 I will employ the non-defeated consequence operation (ND),
not only because I find it intuitive, but also because it is rather conservative compared
to other approaches (Benferhat et al. 1997), so whatever follows by ND, follows also
from the perspective of most of other approaches to prioritized reasoning.14
First, we say that  is a maximal consistent subset of  iff  ⊆ , is consistent
and for any φ ∈  \  the result of adding φ to  is inconsistent. Then we say that a
formula φ is free in (φ ∈ F()) iff φ belongs to every maximal consistent subset of
. To see how the selection of free formulas works, consider a few examples.
Example 1 Suppose  = {p,¬p, q}. Intuitively, p and ¬p are problematic and q is
innocent.  has two maximal consistent subsets: MC1 = {p, q} and MC2 = {¬p, q}.
Neither p nor ¬p belongs to both of them, so p,¬p ∈ F(). However, q ∈ MC1
and q ∈ MC2, so q ∈ F().
Example 2 Say  = {¬p, p ∨ q,¬q}. There are three maximal consistent subsets of
 : {¬p, p ∨ q}, {¬q, p ∨ q} and {¬p,¬q}. None of the formulas from  belongs
to all of them, so F() = ∅. Indeed, intuitively speaking, each of those formulas can
play an essential role in deriving a contradiction, so each of them is suspicious.
Example 3 Extend the set from the previous example to  = {¬p, p∨q,¬q, r}. Intu-
itively, r has nothing to do with the fact that  is inconsistent. And indeed, there are
three maximal consistent subsets of  : {¬p, p∨q, r}, {¬q, p∨q, r} and {¬p,¬q, r},
each of them contains r , but none of the other formulas belongs to each of them. So
r ∈ F(), but ¬p, p ∨ q,¬q ∈ F().
The dominant subset of  is  = F(1)∪ F(1 ∪2)∪· · ·∪ F(1 ∪· · ·∪n).
This is supposed to be the set of those formulas which are not suspicious, built with
the preference to more entrenched premises.
Example 4 To observe how this encodes the preference relation, consider a very simple
case where  = 〈1, 2〉, 1 = {p} and 2 = {¬p}. There is exactly one maximally
consistent subset of 1, namely {p} itself. Thus, p ∈ F(1) because F(1) = {p}.
12 Sometimes, I will be sloppy and talk about a formula belonging to  instead of it belonging to some i
which belongs to , but I think this will save space and won’t cause any important ambiguity.
13 For a survey, see Benferhat et al. (1998) and Verhoeven (2003).
14 Choosing logic for a goal we often are more concerned with satisficing than optimizing (Herbert 2008).
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1 ∪ 2 has two maximally consistent subsets: {p} and {¬p}. Since no formula is in
both of them, F(1 ∪ 2) = ∅. But this means that  = F(1) ∪ F(1 ∪ 2) =
F(1) = {p}. Thus, even though we had only two premises in our  (one of which
was the negation of the other) it was the one belonging to the more entrenched set that
was retained.
Given that we made the assumption that each level (so also 1) is separately con-
sistent, F(1) = 1.
Example 5 Consider a slightly more complicated example, where  is composed of
〈1, 2, 3〉, 1 = {p, q}, 2 = {¬p ∨ ¬q, r} and 3 = {¬r}. Then F(1) = 1.
1 ∪ 2 = {p, q,¬p ∨ ¬q, r} has three maximally consistent subsets: {p, q, r}, {p,
¬p ∨¬q, r}, {q,¬p ∨¬q, r}. These have only one common element—r , so F(1 ∪
2) = {r}. 1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 = {p, q,¬p ∨ ¬q, r,¬r}. It has six maximally con-
sistent subsets: {p, q,¬r}, {p, q, r}, {p,¬p ∨ ¬q,¬r}, {p,¬p ∨ ¬q, r}, {q,¬p ∨
¬q,¬r}, {q,¬p∨¬q, r} and they have no common element. So F(1∪2∪3) = ∅.
Thus,  = {p, q, r}. That is, 2 “lost” with 1 when it came to ¬p ∨¬q, but “won”
with 3 the “fight” about the value of r .
We are ready to define the operation of non-defeated consequence. We say that A
is a non-defeated consequence of  iff it classically follows from :
 	ND A iff  	CL A
8 Dynamic proofs for non-defeated consequence
Playing around with non-defeated consequence is pretty complex: to find out that
something follows from a certain belief base you have to survey all relevant subsets,
and for each of them check if it is consistent and if it is not a proper subset of another
consistent set, find the common elements of such sets and then verify that the supposed
conclusion classically follows from the premise set thus obtained.
ND-consequence relation has been around for some time and wasn’t originally
provided with a proof theory. Verhoeven (2003) developed an adaptive logic in the
so-called standard format which captures this consequence operation. She also con-
structed a slightly more user-friendly direct proof theory capturing this consequence
operation. Details lie beyond the scope of this paper—what’s important is that I will
explain and use the latter in what follows. Thus, adaptive logic comes in because it
provides ND with a proof theory.15
The basic elements of a proof are pretty much like in the simple adaptive logic
I have already described, but there are some slight modifications. To start with, for
any formula φ ∈ i , I will sometimes write i (φ) instead of φ, just to keep track of
how entrenched a premise is. Sometimes, instead of writing a whole formula in the
dependence column I will just write a line number where it occurs in a proof. The
15 Incidentally, the language of the adaptive logic also has a greater expressive power than prioritized belief
bases. For example one can express that a certain formula belongs either to 1 or to 2.
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proof system employs two main rules. The first says that, roughly speaking, premises
can be introduced based on the assumption that they are not proven to be suspicious
(I will explain what it means to be proven to be suspicious later). This is marked
by introducing a premise in the line, but also adding it in its own dependence col-
umn:
Prem If φ ∈ i , one may introduce a line consisting of an
appropriate line number, φ, a dash, PREM and {iφ}.
(Dash is just a place-holder for line numbers which a step relies on. In case of
premise introduction, the step does not depend on any other line.)
We need only one more rule—the Unconditional Rule (Ru). It tells us that if some-
thing classically follows from the premises we have, given the dependencies, then we
can introduce it, making sure that the dependence set “accumulates”:
Ru If φ1, . . . , φk 	C L ψ and φ1, . . . , φk occur in the proof on
conditions 1, · · · ,k respectively, one may add a line
consisting of the appropriate line number, ψ , the numbers
of the lines in which φ1, . . . , φk are derived, and 1 ∪
· · · ∪ k .
The rule is called “unconditional” because it doesn’t allow for introducing new
elements into dependence sets—it only preserves the dependencies.
The marking definition which adequately captures ND-consequence requires a few
preliminary explanations. First of all, proofs proceed in stages: each application of a
rule moves us to the next stage. A set of formulas  is shown inconsistent at a given
stage of a proof if ⊥ has been derived on the condition  at this stage.
Given that a proof is at a certain stage s, Minics() is the set of minimal subsets
of  shown to be inconsistent at stage s. It is important that we look only at minimal
suspicious sets, because we want to localize the anomalies as much as possible.
Since 1 is assumed to be consistent, Minics(1) will always be empty. If, on the
other hand, Minics(1 ∪ 2) is non-empty, it is the formulas from 2 which are to
be blamed, and thus the unreliable formulas (from 1 ∪ 2) are just ⋃ Minics(1 ∪
2)∩2 (recall Minic-sets are not sets of formulas, but rather families of inconsistent
sets of formulas). In general, given a belief base 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉, the set of formulas
unreliable at stage s, U ns is the union of the family of sets
(⋃





Minics(1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3) ∩ 3
)
∪ · · · ∪
∪
(⋃
Minics(1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 ∪ · · · ∪ n) ∩ n
)
At last, the marking definition: a line i with condition  is marked at a stage s if 
overlaps with U ns . Thus, if we introduce a new line into a proof and want to figure out
which lines are marked, we have to go over all the lines introduced so far, identify the
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minimal subsets known to be inconsistent and “cut off” their weakest elements and
all moves in the proof that relied on them. Let’s take a look at an example.
Example 6 Say our belief set is composed of three sets: 1 = {¬p, p∨q}, 2 = {¬q}
and 3 = {r}. I’ll first give the proof and then provide a commentary.
(1) ¬p – Prem {1(¬p)}
(2) p ∨ q – Prem {1(p ∨ q)}
(3) r – Prem {3(r)} 8,9
(4) ¬p ∧ r 1,3 Ru {1(¬p), 3(r)} 8,9
(5) ¬p 4 Ru {1(¬p), 3(r)} 8,9
(6) ¬q – Prem {2(¬q)} 10
(7) q 2,5 Ru {1(p ∨ q), 1(¬p), 3(r)} 8,9
(8) ⊥ 6,7 Ru {1(p ∨ q), 1(¬p), 3(r), 2(¬q)} 8,9,10
(9) q 1,2 Ru {1(¬p), 1(p ∨ q)}
(10) ⊥ 6,9 Ru {1(¬p), 1(p ∨ q), 2(¬q)} 10
Up to line (8) the proof develops normally without any lines being marked. After
the introduction of line (8), however, the situation changes. Minic8(1) = ∅ (by
definition), Minic8(1 ∪ 2) = ∅, but Minic8(1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3) is a singleton con-
taining as its only element set {1(p ∨ q), 1(¬p), 3(r), 2(¬q)} which is identical with⋃
Minic8(1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3). Clearly, Minic8(1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3) ∩ 3 = {3(r)} = U 38 so at
stage 8 all lines in whose dependence line 3(r) occurs are marked.
It is quite clear that ultimately 3(r) is not responsible for the contradiction. Once the
proof is developed a bit further, up to line (10), the situation changes. Minic10(1 ∪
2 ∪3) is identical to Minic10(1 ∪2) and contains only one element: the depen-
dence set from line 10. It has been shown to be inconsistent, and it’s a proper subset
of the dependence set from line 8 (which was previously shown inconsistent). Thus,⋃
Minic10(1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3) ∩ 3 = ∅ and Minic10(1 ∪ 2) ∩ 2 = {2(¬q)} = U 310.
Thus, all and only those lines which contain 2(¬q) are marked in stage 10.
This should suffice as an exposition of what dynamic proofs for the non-defeated
consequence operation look like (final derivability is defined on Sect. 6).16
This indicates that dynamic proofs are, in a sense, tentative. To really know that
something follows from the premises you not only have to derive it in an unmarked
proof line, but also to know that the above-mentioned conditions are satisfied. In the
propositional case, final derivability is decidable for finite premise sets. In the predi-
cative case (needed further on in this paper) the issue is not in general decidable and
one needs to reason in meta-language to establish that the above conditions are met.
Thus, for more interesting languages (for which the classical consequence opera-
tion is not decidable) dynamic proofs, rather than providing us with ultimate reasons to
accept our conclusion, provide us with a systematic method of developing our insight
into our belief set.
16 Verhoeven (2003) proves that the proof theory indeed captures this consequence operation. Also, the
way I described the proof theory is not in the standard format. Showing that the proof theory can be given
a standard-format formulation is beyond our current interests. Details can be found in Verhoeven’s paper.
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Some would insist that this fact indicates that what we’re dealing with is not logic.
This of course hinges on what you mean by logic. In general, discussions whether
something counts as logic or not sometimes seem to me rather verbal, so only a few
brief remarks will have to suffice.
If what someone cares about is decidability or proof-theoretic manageability of
their system, then dynamic logics of the sort discussed above won’t be their thing. But
it is unclear whether computational considerations are to be decisive here (after all,
classical first-order logic is only semi-decidable and second-order logic is not even
axiomatizable; yet they are still called logics). Some other important factors indicate
at least some degree of logicality of the systems: the consequence operation is well-
defined and formal. Particular steps in the proofs are justified by formally described
rules and whole proofs are clearly rule-driven (and the rules employed, even though
they don’t guarantee the truth of the tentative conclusion, certainly help to exclude
problematic premises and to increase the reliability of the conclusion as the proof
proceeds and insight is gained, in certain cases even informing us that the conclusion
is finally derivable). And the fact that just because at a given point we might have to
reject something we were led to accept some time before, although causing serious
computational difficulties, makes the systems more capable of modeling real human
reasoning. We often gain our insight into the logical wealth of our premises only
gradually and our insight into the logical structure of our beliefs is rarely complete.
9 Dynamic proofs and Galileo’s TE
Now that we have described the formal framework, it’s time to get back to Galileo’s
TE and show how the factors mentioned in Sects. 4 and 5 can, within this framework,
be modeled better than by classical means.
Suppose we quantify over bodies freely falling from a certain fixed height in the
same external conditions. The language is first-order, it contains two name constants
l and s for the large cannon ball and the small musket ball. We have a binary func-
tion symbol + which denotes the operation of joining falling bodies (I’ll assume that
joining x and y results in the same object as joining y and x .) and two unary function
symbols W and S; W (x) is the weight of x and S(x) is the speed of x (we assume there
are no problems with these denoting functions). Three binary predicates are involved:
– The identity symbol ‘=’,
– The predicate ‘D’; ‘D(x, y)’ means that there are no differences in material and
shape of x and y that would impact the relation between their rate of falling (so, e.g.
it is not the case that one is made of cotton wool and the other is made of lead, or
that one is really flat and the other round etc.) I will assume that the relation D is
symmetrical.17
– The relational predicate ‘>’; ‘x > y’ means that x is greater than y (we’ll be
comparing weights and speeds, I allow obvious notational variants).
17 Galilei (1638) carefully emphasizes the assumption that the shape of objects is not supposed to be taken
under consideration:
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To shape the premises into a belief base we have to stratify them according to their
entrenchment level. This involves certain complications. The main clue as to what the
degrees of entrenchment Galileo (or the Aristotelian) assigned to the premises involved
is obtained post factum by studying his reasoning (and the dropped premises). It is still
possible that Galileo felt the need to assign different degrees of entrenchment to the
premises only after discovering an inconsistency. Such shifts of entrenchment levels
are not modeled in the reconstruction. Also, the study of Galileo’s reasoning does
not inform us about the priorities of the non-rejected premises. Often we may reach
information about those by carefully studying the context (other writings of Galileo
and other writings from the same period). But even in the absence of such information,
certain priorities do not matter for the reconstruction.
For these reasons the reconstruction that follows, despite improving on the straight-
forward accounts, still involves certain simplifications and idealizations. It already
takes the entrenchment level of the assumption that was dropped to be fixed in the
beginning of the argument. I also impose a certain entrenchment ordering even on
those premises which were retained. To some extent, this only mirrors the intuitions
I have about the plausibility of the premises involved. I do hope most of the readers
will share those intuitions, but (as it should become clear by the end of this paper)
nothing essential hinges on any particular ordering of the retained premises: the main
philosophical point holds, it’s only the particulars of the argument that have to be
reconstructed differently.
After these general remarks, let’s take a look at the Galilean TE itself. One plausible
way to stratify the premises is to divide them into four groups. First, we have the most
entrenched beliefs:
– For no two objects x and y the speed of x can be simultaneously smaller and greater
than the speed of y.
– Objects considered in the TE either fall with the same speed, or one is falling faster
than another.
These are quite entrenched and seem to be conceptually true. Let’s write them down
as premises of an adaptive proof:
1
(1) ∀x, y ¬(S(x) > S(y) ∧ S(y) > S(x)) – Prem {1(1)}
(2) ∀x, y (S(x) > S(y) ∨ S(x) = S(y) ∨ S(y) > S(x)) – Prem {1(2)}
Next, we have a few intuitively weaker but still very entrenched beliefs:
Footnote 17 continued
Aristotle declares that bodies of different weights, in the same medium, travel (in so far as their motion
depends upon gravity) with speeds which are proportional to their weights; this he illustrates by use of
bodies in which it is possible to perceive the pure and unadulterated effect of gravity, eliminating other
considerations, for example, figure as being of small importance, influences which are greatly dependent
upon the medium which modifies the single effect of gravity alone. Thus we observe that gold, the densest
of all substances, when beaten out into a very thin leaf, goes floating through the air; the same thing happens
with stone when ground into a very fine powder. But if you wish to maintain the general proposition you
will have to show that the same rate of speeds is preserved in the case of all heavy bodies, and that a stone
of twenty pounds moves ten times as rapidly as one of two; but I claim that this is false and that, if they fall
from a height of fifty or a hundred cubits, they will reach the earth at the same moment. [p. 109]
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– The body obtained by joining two bodies will be heavier than any of those bodies
separately.
– The large cannon ball is heavier than the small musket ball.
– There is no relevant difference in shape or material between those balls.
– If there is no relevant difference between two objects, there is no relevant difference
between any of these objects and the result of joining them together.18
2
(3) ∀x, y W (x + y) > W (x) – Prem {2(3)}
(4) W (l) > W (s) – Prem {2(4)}
(5) ¬D(l, s) – Prem {2(5)}
(6) ∀x, y (¬D(x, y) → ¬D(x + y, x)) – Prem {2(6)}
Further, we have two assumptions which are still more entrenched than the Aristo-
telian assumption, but I find them less compelling than those in 2 (the reader is free
to differ and to change this particular detail in the proof, this won’t impact the main
point).
– The first one says that if there is no difference in material or shape (in the relevant
sense) between two bodies, then the lighter one will not fall faster than the heavier
one.
– The second one says that if y is faster than x , then joining those objects will result
in an object slower than y.
3
(7) ∀x, y [¬D(x, y) → (W (x) > W (y) → ¬S(x) < S(y))] – Prem {3(7)}
(8) ∀x, y (S(x) > S(y) → S(x + y) < S(x)) – Prem {3(8)}
Finally we have (a simplified version of) the Aristotelian assumption: if no relevant
shape/material difference occurs, one object falls faster than the other iff it is heavier
than the other:
4
(9) ∀x, y [¬D(x, y) → (W (x) > W (y) ≡ S(x) > S(y))] – Prem {4(9)}
Observe that (9) might prima facie be on a par with (7) and (8). What can be said
for assigning (9) to a lower level? For one thing, (7) is a weakening of (9). For another,
when the Aristotelian is faced with the destructive part, they abandon (9) and not (7)
or (8), which (at least post facto) shows that if the reconstruction is to be correct, (9)
has to be weaker than (7) and (8) after all. (As we will see, once (9) is rejected and
(7) and (8) retained, there is nothing mysterious about reaching the positive solution:
it simply follows from the premises.)
Let’s proceed with the proof now. First, thanks to (4), (5) and (9), we infer that l is
moving faster than s.
(10) S(l) > S(s) 4, 5, 9 RU {2(4), 2(5), 4(9)}
18 This is false if the objects do not fall in vacuum. But here we just follow Galileo in his claim (cited in
footnote 17) that we are to ignore such factors.
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Now, (8) together with (10) entail that joining l with s (which is slower than l) will
yield a body that will be slower than l on its own.
(11) S(l + s) < S(l) 8, 10 RU {2(4), 2(5), 3(8), 4(9)}
(3) gives us the conclusion that l + s is heavier than l itself.
(12) W (l + s) > W (l) 3 RU {2(3)}
(5) and (6) entail that no relevant difference in shape or matter between l and l + s
occurs.
(13) ¬D(l + s, l) 5, 6 RU {2(5), 2(6)}
Now, (9) with lines (12) and (13) delivers us:
(14) S(l + s) > S(l) 9, 12, 13 RU {2(3), 2(5), 2(6), 4(9)}
which together with (1) contradicts line 11. This shows that a certain set is incon-
sistent.
(15) ⊥ 1, 11, 14 RU {1(1), 2(3), 2(4), 2(5), 2(6), 3(8), 4(9)}
This, with our marking definition, means we have to cancel our commitment to line
9 and all the inferences that depend on this line.
Moreover, this means that since {(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (9)} is inconsistent,
{(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8)} entails the negation of (9). That is, we not only can cancel
our commitment to the Aristotelian assumption, but we also can explicitly reject it, as
long as we trust the more entrenched premises involved. Thus, we obtain the following
situation:
(1) ∀x, y ¬(S(x) > S(y) ∧ S(y) > S(x)) – Prem {1(1)}
(2) ∀x, y (S(x) > S(y) ∨ S(x) = S(y)∨∨S(y) > S(x)) – Prem {
1(2)}
(3) ∀x, y W (x + y) > W (x) – Prem {2(3)}
(4) W (l) > W (s) – Prem {2(4)}
(5) ¬D(l, s) – Prem {2(5)}
(6) ∀x, y (¬D(x, y) → ¬D(x + y, x)) – Prem {2(6)}
(7) ∀x, y [¬D(x, y) → (W (x) > W (y) →→ ¬S(x) < S(y))] – Prem {
3(7)}
(8) ∀x, y (S(x) > S(y) → S(x + y) < S(x)) – Prem {3(8)}
(9) ∀x, y [¬D(x, y) → (W (x) > W (y) ≡≡ S(x) > S(y))] - Prem {
4(9)} 
(10) S(l) > S(s) 4, 5, 9 RU {2(4), 2(5), 4(9)} 
(11) S(l + s) < S(l) 8, 10 RU {2(4), 2(5), 3(8), 4(9)} 
(12) W (l + s) > W (l) 3 RU {2(3)}
(13) ¬D(l + s, l) 5, 6 RU {2(5), 2(6)}
(14) S(l + s) > S(l) 9, 12, 13 RU {2(3), 2(5), 2(6), 4(9)} 
(15) ⊥ 1, 11, 14 RU {1(1), 2(3), 2(4), 2(5),
2(6), 3(8), 4(9)} 
(16) ¬(9) 1, 3, 4,
5, 6, 8 RU {1(1), 2(3), 2(4), 2(5),
2(6), 3(8)}
So far so good. We’re done with the destructive part of the TE and we avoided
logical explosion: it is not the case that right now we can infer any sentence whatso-
ever—the contradiction depended crucially on (9), and we retracted our commitment
to this premise and all the steps that depended on its truth. However, we can also infer
that in fact s and l will be falling at the same rate.
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(16) ¬S(l) < S(s) 4, 5, 7 RU {2(4), 2(5), 3(7)}
(17) S(l) > S(s) → S(l + s) < S(l) 8 RU {3(8)}
(18) ¬S(l + s) < S(l) 7, 12, 13 RU {2(3), 2(5), 2(6), 3(7)}
(19) ¬S(s) < S(l) 17, 18 RU {2(3), 2(5), 2(6),
3(7), 3(8)}
(20) S(s) = S(l) 2, 16, 19 RU {1(2), 2(3), 2(4),
2(5), 2(6), 3(7), 3(8)}
This completes the proof. Contrary to Brown’s claims, we were able to use one
and the same structural, rule-driven and formalized argument to derive the antinomy,
reject one of the premises, and then, without any (as Norton would have it) stumbles,
to reach the desired conclusion.
10 Final remarks
Brown argues against the representability of TEs by means of arguments (the claim
that TEs are not arguments arguably follows from this claim: if TEs cannot be sensibly
described as arguments, they are not arguments). Brown rests his case on examples of
TEs in which a contradiction was encountered and a positive solution was nevertheless
reached. Thus, ultimately, the case rests on the claim that making sensible use of a
contradiction or rejecting previously held beliefs and coming to an agreement cannot
be modeled in terms of a formal logical system. This claim, I suggest, has been shown
false: there are plausible formal systems which handle the phenomena Brown refers
to in his arguments.
A separate question is whether this has any direct bearing on the “nature of TEs”. Is
conducting arguments really what happens when we use a TE? Assuming this question
makes sense and there are methods which in principle would allow us to settle it, our
considerations aren’t one of them. The goal of this paper was to criticize an argument
against the argument view of TEs, not to support the argument view directly. What
has been argued for is the representability of relevant TEs in terms of arguments, not
their identity with arguments.
An analogy might help to clarify this point. Consider the discussions surrounding
mind-reading. It is rather clear that very often we are able to predict other people’s
behavior. One view, the theory-theory view suggests that this is because we have in
mind a certain (folk) theory of what people do in certain circumstances and use it to
make predictions. Its main opponent, the simulationist view, insists that rather than
using a theory and propositional reasoning, we just “put ourselves in other person’s
shoes” (whatever this would consist in) and extrapolate a non-propositional simulation
of what we would do in such circumstances. Whatever the outcome of this debate is,
this doesn’t impact the usefulness of formulating a theory of what people do given
certain circumstances to try to predict their behavior. Even if the theory-theory view
is false and normally we don’t use any theory to predict others’ behavior, it is still
scientifically interesting whether such a theory can be formulated and how successful
(or unsuccessful) it is.
Similarly, the debate about the “real nature” of TEs (however it is to be settled)
doesn’t have any direct impact on the usefulness of having an explicit theory which
helps to make predictions about what the TEs are used to make predictions about.
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For instance, even if the Galilean TE “really” wasn’t an argument, this doesn’t mean
there is no point in constructing a very closely related argument. Quite to the con-
trary: just like psychology meant to help us predict human behavior has to be done
propositionally, physics has to be done propositionally too.
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